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Introduction
The digital game industry is thriving. The Newzoo Global Games Market Report forecast annual
revenues for 2018 at $137.9 billion (Wijman 2018). In Canada, 596 studios generated $3.7
billion of the country’s GDP in 2017 and 40,600 direct and indirect jobs (ESAC 2017). In the
United States, the game industry accounted for $11.7 billion of GDP in 2015; it directly or
indirectly employs over 220,000 workers across nearly 2,500 companies (Siwek 2017).
However, digital game development is not immune from disruption. The industry is undergoing
transformations affecting its established approaches to managing organizations, producing
games, and generating revenues (O’Donnell 2014). It also faces challenges with respect to
working conditions, with game studios often accused of treating their development talent poorly
(Williams 2015). Human resource management issues, ranging from long, uncompensated
working hours to lack of advancement opportunities and insecure employment, have been linked
to the organizational processes governing game production (Legault and Weststar 2017). In
particular, the game industry is prototypical of post-industrial knowledge work where the project
management regime creates an “iron triangle” that requires development teams to create
innovative and high-quality products, on tight, inflexible timelines, and under intense budgetary
pressures. They do this in an environment of normative managerial control where commitment to
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the work and the team becomes an internalized lever for self-exploitation (Peticca-Harris,
Weststar and McKenna 2015).
An increasing number of game developers are dissatisfied with their working conditions.
Dissatisfaction is a necessary condition for workers to engage in collective action to gain the
representational power needed to achieve change in the workplace. John Kelly’s (1998)
mobilization theory, a prominent meta-model of social factors shaping collective mobilization,
identifies four determinants: 1) individual challenges must be reframed as injustices against the
collective by a ruling group; 2) the organizational structure of the collective, including
communication channels, the degree and nature of member interaction, and the density and
strength of social networks must be sufficiently robust; 3) the mobilization must have leadership
to sustain a favorable cost-benefit rationale for the effort and maintain social interactions across
the mobilizing group; and 4) there must be reasonable opportunity to engage in collective action,
a factor which includes consideration of the balance of power between the parties, the costs of
repression by the ruling group, and the alternative avenues for subordinate groups to pursue their
claims.
To date, studies of game labor have tended to document problems in the working lives of
developers, while devoting relatively limited attention to solutions, or to collective representation
as a step toward solutions. Our research, in contrast, assesses developers’ capacity to engage in
collective mobilization. Though this industry shares characteristics with the film and television
industry, due to important contextual differences game workers cannot follow the same historical
path to unionization. It is important, therefore, to systematically map the landscape of collective
mobilization in the game industry. Documenting collective actions reported in the game press
and mainstream media over the past five decades, this article asks: Are the collective actions of
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developers building momentum toward a viable, sustained mobilization? We have archived these
media sources as part of our research on the game industry, and, unless otherwise stated, these
sources are thematically categorized online at http://gameqol.org. As we were directly involved
in some of the events and actions catalogued in this article, it is important to note that our
chronicle is informed by our interconnected roles as third-party researchers, subject-matter
advisors, and participant-observers. Our research is biased by our North American perspective,
and we do not claim to provide a global representation of game workers’ mobilization efforts.
Despite its geographic limits, this chronicle of resistance and collectivity is offered as a
contribution to the growing scholarly literature on digital labor politics generally.
Chronicle of Resistance and Collectivity
Workers of all types engage in individual actions, such as speaking to managers, to improve their
work or that of others. These actions can take collective form when workers share problems and
advocate in small groups. Workers also routinely act on their displeasure by exiting
organizations. However, individual actions do little to induce widespread change within
organizations or industries. Rather, it is through public and collective actions that momentum for
change is built. In this section, we present a thematic survey of such actions in the games
industry, including Early Efforts, the Quality of Life Movement, Exposés of Working
Conditions, Union Efforts, and Gender Equity Struggles, while Figure 1 gives a chronology of
the same events. We conclude by analyzing the impact of these events on building a lasting
collective mobilization of workers in the game industry.
Figure 1: Chronology of Collective Action in the Game Industry
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
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Early Efforts
Developers’ early forms of resistance and mobilization show a movement from individualized to
public and collective actions. Perhaps the first documented instance of public resistance was
when developer Warren Robinett surreptitiously inserted a feature displaying his name into the
1979 Atari game Adventure. Robinett (2003) was responding to Atari management’s decision to
stop crediting the contributions of individual programmers and to name only the Atari brand.
Robinett interpreted his act as one of labor resistance and agency, writing that management “had
the power to keep my name off the box, but I had the power to put it on the screen” (Robinett
2003, xviii). Dropping such “Easter eggs” into games became a common approach to signal
developers’ creative contribution (Yarwood 2016).
Game developers formed their first collective body, the Computer Game Developers’
Association (CGDA), later renamed the International Game Developers Association (IGDA), in
1994. Founder Ernest Adams’ account of the instigation of the CGDA/IGDA has collectivism at
its heart (Hoffman 2007). Adams foregrounds the importance of developers getting together and
discussing their craft and the improved bargaining power that can come from those interactions.
Today, the IGDA is an international organization with over 12,000 members. It operates local
chapters in more than 100 cities and maintains twenty-five Special Interest Groups on key topics.
The IGDA has made important contributions to protect the livelihood of developers and the
cultural freedom of games, to advocate for demographic diversity in the industry, and to research
developers’ working conditions. There is, however, an inherent scope constraint in the mission
and structure of the IGDA, which has never purported to be a legal representative agent of
developers like a trade union. The IGDA takes an individualized approach to solving
employment problems rooted in educating members to increase their individual negotiating
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power, creating voluntary codes of conduct and best practices for studios, and, in discrete
instances, applying public pressure to studios that act poorly toward their employees. A largely
volunteer-driven organization, the IGDA “exists in a tenuous space, relying on the industry for
its bread and butter, but also looking out for its greater well-being” (Hoffman 2007). As a result,
the IGDA has been criticized for its unwillingness to act aggressively against exploitative
practices and diverting energy from other forms of labor solidarity (Kazemi 2013).
The Quality of Life Movement
The discourse on developers’ working conditions came to the fore in 2004 due to a series of
events, which, considered collectively, inaugurated the Quality of Life (QoL) movement in the
game industry. In April 2004, the IGDA published the white paper, “Quality of Life in the
Games Industry: Challenges and Best Practices,” which was featured at the preeminent Game
Developers Conference (GDC) (GDC Vault 2004). Co-author Gregory Abrenio remarked that
the report was written by a newly formed QoL Committee to recognize the costs of poor quality
of life for developers and the industry. The report shone a light on core employment challenges
and became a touchstone for game industry reflections on working conditions and for academics
turning to the study of digital labor.
In November 2004, a blog written under the moniker “EA Spouse” by the fiancé of a
developer at Electronic Arts (EA) took the industry by storm. EA Spouse’s account of working
conditions at EA eloquently and candidly brought the issues of the QoL report to life. Over 4,500
comments flooded the post with similar accounts. The story spread across the game and
mainstream press and inspired early academic accounts of game labor (e.g., Dyer-Witheford and
de Peuter 2006; Pettica-Harris, Weststar and McKenna 2015). “EA Spouse” was a watershed
moment in raising awareness about exploitive working conditions in the games industry and is
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also an early example of the power of social media to spark change-oriented discourse. EA
Spouse, later revealed to be developer Erin Hoffman, became a high-profile spokesperson for
QoL. Hoffman created a now-defunct website, “Game Watch,” to collect stories from developers
with the intent to leverage them against studios and foster peer-based self-regulation.
Fuelling the QoL fire, developers filed a number of class action suits between 2004 and
2006 against prominent studios for unpaid overtime. Two suits were against EA. One, led by
Jaime Kirschenbaum on behalf of game designers, settled for $15.6 million, and another, led by
Leander Hasty (at the time, the fiancé of Hoffman and subject of the EA Spouse letter) on behalf
of programmers, settled for $14.9 million (Surette 2006). Similar suits were launched against
Sony Entertainment, which settled for $8.5 million, Viveni, and Activision. The EA suit resulted
in the reclassification of many developers to be eligible for overtime provisions under California
law. However, an unforeseen effect was that EA relocated portions of its business to Florida and
Canada, where overtime laws remained more permissive.
In 2009, the IGDA conducted a second QoL survey, which had an expanded set of
questions, including, notably, questions about developers’ propensity to vote for a union. Rather
than flow from a strategic mandate of the IGDA, these union-related questions were proposed by
us, as labor relations scholars advising on the project. This IGDA survey provided the first data
showing game developers’ positive attitude toward unionization (Legault and Weststar 2012).
The QoL survey, more recently renamed the “Developer Satisfaction Survey,” was conducted in
partnership with us between 2014 and 2017. The resultant reports continually highlighted
employment challenges (Legault and Weststar 2015; Weststar and Legault 2015a) as well as
gender- and, to a lesser extent, ethnicity-based inequities (Weststar, O’Meara, Gosse and Legault
2017). In 2014, the survey questions about unionization were retained and, once again, the
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survey results showed support for unionization; 48% would vote for a union at their studio and
64% supported a form of sector-based unionization (Tô, Legault and Weststar 2016). In 2015,
our talk, “Do Game Developers Want a Union?” (Weststar and Legault 2015b), was accepted to
the GDC, and we were invited to deliver a “Unions 101” presentation at the second-largest game
developer conference, the Montreal International Games Summit, in November 2018. Such
panels reflect the growing institutional legitimacy of discussing unionization as a potential
solution to workplace problems in the digital games industry.
Exposés of Working Conditions
EA Spouse set the stage for further whistleblowing about studio employment practices. A spate
of exposés kept the QoL discourse alive and sometimes resulted in workplace changes. In
January 2010, “Rockstar Spouse” posted on the premiere game industry online magazine,
Gamasutra, decrying the working environment at Rockstar San Diego during the development of
the game Red Dead Redemption. The story went viral and the IGDA issued a public statement to
the studio about “appropriate” balance in working hours. Around the same time, a story broke
regarding extended, uncompensated “crunch” time and poor management practices at Australian
Team Bondi, the studio making LA Noire. A series of tweets led to local and international
coverage as well as two investigative journalism pieces. The IGDA was said to be investigating
the allegations, but no further action was publicly reported. Following the release of LA Noire,
the game’s publisher, Rockstar, cut ties with Team Bondi, in a perceived effort to distance
themselves from the studio.1
In a now established genre, embittered “38 Studios Spouse” posted a Gamasutra blog in
2012. She chronicled the story of moving her family across the US for her husband’s new job.
Five months later, however, the studio declared bankruptcy. Many developers at 38 Studios
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claimed that they had been kept in the dark, had gone without pay or benefits for weeks, and
never recouped their losses. The story received considerable press due to the high public profile
of 38 Studios’ founder, pro-baseball star Curt Shilling, and the state monies used to attract the
company to Rhode Island in the first place. In another investigative account, the studio Trendy
Entertainment came under fire in 2013 for excessive “crunch” and gender discrimination in
hiring and compensation on Dungeon Defenders II. The IGDA condemned the practices and a
follow-up piece reported that internal changes had been made. And most recently, an
investigative account was published on August 7, 2018 about sexist culture at Riot Games. On
August 29, Riot posted an open letter to their website about the steps they will take to initiate
cultural change. As these examples show, journalists, workers, and fans seem increasingly
inclined to call studios out for perceived poor practices and studios seem increasingly inclined to
respond to them.
Union Efforts
In perhaps the first direct collective action in support of unionizing, Ubisoft France developers
experimented with union forms and created the anonymous “virtual” union, “Ubifree,” in
December 1998. Their website described negative working conditions and called on Ubisoft
employees around the world to join Ubifree. This initiative, launched in the early days of the
Web, generated a wealth of supportive messages. A few months into the Ubifree campaign,
Ubisoft France announced some workplace improvements, such as including an employee
representative on some internal committees, and Ubifree disbanded. There was an attempt to
revive the Ubifree concept in Canada in September 2010, with a few posts to a website
announcing “Ubifree 2.0: The Other Side of Ubisoft Montreal,” but it gained no traction.
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Some Swedish game developers are represented through sector-wide unions and union
confederations. Unionen, a private sector white-collar union, said they have about 200 gamedeveloper members and noted that a few other Swedish unions likely have some developers
among their members (e.g., a Swedish engineers’ union). In most instances, however, Swedish
game companies do not negotiate directly with unions and they lack specific collective
bargaining agreements for their workplaces. An exception is EA Digital Illusions CE (DICE),
which was pressured into entering a direct bargaining agreement with Unionen in 2004 following
bad press about firings and attempts to eliminate the nominal union committee in place under the
broad sectoral agreement for white collar workers (ETUI n.d.; Fridén 2013).
In May 2011, the French studio Eden Games held a one-day, symbolic “strike” in protest
against their parent company, Atari, for perceived mismanagement and lack of transparency in
the face of restructuring and layoffs. Eden demanded a meaningful voice in the restructuring plan
and fair compensation. One year later, Atari began a divesture process and Eden was liquidated
in January 2013. However, Eden employees went on to resurrect the studio as an independent
company.
Awareness of another option for workplace representation rose in 2015 when the German
trade union Ver.di accused Goodgame Studios of dismissing employees for attempting to form a
“works council.” In Germany, works councils are firm-level institutions that give legal voice to
employees. They often complement unions by helping to tailor national agreements to local
conditions. Goodgame countered the allegations, indicating that they supported employees’ right
to form a works council or another representative body. It appears that a subset of the employee
group was engaged in developing an alternative to a works council, which Goodgame felt was
more suited to the studio’s work conditions. Developers ultimately voted to reject the works
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council advocated by Ver.di, and Goodgame announced that the studio-supported employee
group would address workplace matters.
In North America, concerted attention was paid to unions in 2016-17 when video game
voice actors represented by SAG-AFTRA (Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists) struck prominent US studios for eleven months. Key issues were
vocal stress and rights to secondary compensation. The strike garnered considerable media
attention and prompted discussions about the rights of voice actors as compared to those of other
game industry workers. The race-to-the-bottom argument—“Developers don’t get residuals, so
why should voice actors?”—was challenged and debated on social media.
Union efforts have since escalated. First, in November 2017, a game developers’ union
formed again in France, the Syndicat des Travailleurs et Travailleuses du Jeu Vidéo (STJV),
stating:
Up until now, there existed no structure to allow workers of the video games
industry to express themselves publicly and collectively. In such a situation,
only the point of view of a small fringe of the industry (for example editors or
employers) could be heard by society and the government. Also, associating
inside a union facilitated access to help and information, enabling us to defend
and improve our working conditions. (STJV 2018)
These newly unionized developers did not delay in exercising their rights; STJV members went
on strike at Eugen Systems in February 2018. Although they engaged in mediated talks with the
employer, the workers ended their strike in April, saying they would “conserve [their] resources
for the future,” adding, “this novel social movement reinforced us in the idea that it was not in
vain, and that we were right to fight for our rights.”
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Second, the announcement of a union-focused roundtable at the 2018 GDC, chaired by
IGDA Executive Director Jen MacLean, galvanized a group that had already been discussing
industry unionization online. Descending upon the GDC with its pro-union campaign, this group,
Game Workers Unite (GWU), dominated the roundtable and were bolstered by the union
representatives from IATSE (International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees). A GWU
spokesperson framed the roundtable as the first step in a long campaign. In addition to GWU
International, there are ten local GWU chapters, including in Brazil, Canada, the UK, Germany
and the STJV in France. GWU convened a panel at the developer conference PAX Dev in
August 2018, “The Case for Unionizing the Game Industry,” and is actively working on
additional interventions. In December, 2018 the UK chapter became a legal trade union as a
semi-autonomous branch of the existing Independent Workers’ Union of Great Britain (IWGB).
Gender Equity Struggles
Alongside mobilizations around poor working conditions, members of the game community have
mobilized against sexism in the industry. Whereas the EA Spouse blog was the spark of the
“quality of life” movement, the 2012 Kickstarter campaign of Anita Sarkeesian was a trigger for
sexism. Sarkeesian’s project to critically examine the depiction of women in digital games made
her the target of a prolonged online campaign of misogynistic abuse. While academics had long
been writing about gender and video games, support groups like Women in Games International
(WIGI) existed, and female developers and gamers certainly knew the challenges of being a
woman in this male-dominated industry, Sarkeesian’s treatment publicly exposed the virulent
underbelly of sexism in game culture. The floodgates opened, with articles, blogs, and
testimonials about games and sexism proliferating on the internet and WIG topics gaining
prominence at industry events and conferences.
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Emerging from this context, a series of Twitter hashtags built WIG awareness and
community through 2012-13. “#1ReasonWhy” went viral after female game developers
responded to a male developer’s tweet, “Why are there so few lady game creators?”, with a
deluge of accounts of sexist and inequitable treatment. “#1ReasonToBe” quickly followed, with
female game developers engaging in supportive dialogue and celebrating the incentives to work
in games. And “#1ReasonMentors” began to connect women developers, while the now-defunct
website 1reasonwhy.net was established to profile the work of women in games.
“#1ReasonToBe” became a standing session at the GDC.
Sexism in the games industry intensified and darkened with #GamerGate, a hashtag used
by individuals directing sexist and misogynistic abuse at prominent female game developers,
journalists, and academics. #GamerGate became the locus of debate about gender equality and
inclusion in the industry, giving rise to some direct action. For instance, in October 2014
#GamerGate followers successfully pressured Intel to pull its ads from Gamasutra. Gamergaters
were angered by a Gamasutra article by Leigh Alexander criticizing gamer culture. Intel issued a
statement that they were not taking sides in “an increasingly bitter debate in the gaming
community” and that they “believe men and women should be treated the same” (Good 2014).
Faced with mounting pressure not to be seen as sexist, Intel reinstated its advertisements in
Gamasutra in November 2014 and in January 2015 announced a $300 million fund to improve
the diversity of the Intel workforce and support WIG efforts. A partnership with the IGDA
Foundation created the “Intel Scholars” program, which sent twenty-nine aspiring women
developers to GDC 2015. The working conditions of women have become a key rallying issue
and, as illustrated by the case of Riot Games noted above, it is increasingly difficult for the game
industry to turn a blind eye to gender equity struggles.
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Requirements of Sustained Collective Action
We revisit Kelly’s (1998) mobilization theory, which we summarized in our introduction, in light
of the events presented above. We can conclude that game developers have demonstrated raised
consciousness of themselves as workers and about the specific challenges they face as
workers. Conversations about developers’ poor working conditions and about the negative
experiences of women in the industry—and about the intersection of these dynamics—are
occurring with greater frequency, vigor, and engagement. These discussions have played out
across social media and at in-person industry events (i.e., conference sessions and the GWU
actions) and increasingly acknowledge affinity with cognate groups (e.g., voice actors). The
IGDA has inserted itself in the debates about game labor conditions, albeit carefully, and, over
time, this professional association has developed a consistent stance against “crunch” and the
lack of diversity in the industry. Explicitly pro-union bodies, such as STJV and GWU, have
recently emerged and engaged in direct action. And, partly in response to the QoL movement of
2004-06, digital game labor studies has emerged as an interdisciplinary academic subfield. Based
on the developments, campaigns, and actions documented by our research, we would argue that
the employment problems of the game industry have been increasingly reframed as collective
and systemic issues rather than as the experiences of individual workers who are not strong
enough to “cut it,” or the isolated, anomalous behavior of individual studios. In these ways,
Kelly’s first determinant of collective mobilization—that individual challenges must be reframed
as injustices against the collective by a ruling group—has been achieved in the game industry.
Significant progress has also been made on the second determinant—the capacity of the
organizational structure and the strength of social networks—due to the industry’s technologyrich, networked organization. Game workers are highly connected and information is easily

13

disseminated within their communities. Events that bring game workers together are also
common, both in terms of large national or international events (e.g., GDC, MIGS, PAX) and
local interest groups (e.g., IGDA chapters, indie meet-ups, emerging GWU locals). And perhaps
most importantly, the industry relies heavily on social networks for recruitment, training, and
professional development. In short, there is ample organizational capacity for mobilization.
Achieving these two conditions of mobilization through the actions identified above,
game workers have brought change to their industry. However, these interventions remain
localized and disjointed, and where changes have been instituted, these are often involuntary on
the part of the studios, stemming from a class action ruling, public shaming and peer pressure, or
community pressure from institutional bodies such as the IGDA. Yet, changes they remain. For
instance, we have documented consistent improvement in working time in the game industry
over the past fifteen years (Legault and Weststar 2015).
With regard to Kelly’s third determinant, leadership, we argue that the game industry is at
a significant juncture. In the past, figureheads have emerged at flashpoints—Hoffmann and
Sarkeesian, for example—but their leadership has been confined to single issues, has not grown
beyond advocacy, and has failed to unite game workers, locally, nationally, or internationally,
under the banner of a common collective vision or way forward. The first Ubifree “union”
existed on very narrow grounds. Organizations with a degree of institutional structure, longevity,
and reach such as the IGDA remain conservative in their advocacy efforts, maintain a precarious
balance of loyalty to both employers and developers, and reject the notion that they are a
representative labor body akin to a union. In Sweden, where game developers are members of
unions, the unions negotiate with diverse employer associations across a sector (i.e., white-collar
workers) on issues typically related to minimum standards (ETUI, n.d.). There is limited
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attention to specific game industry issues. However, a new set of leaders may be emerging in the
form of the founders of the STJV and GWU. If these groups can continue to build leadership and
organizational capacity within the ranks of developers, and with the support of established
unions (like the GWU UK case), they could become lasting institutions. It is necessary, however,
for these groups to achieve some definitive wins in the short- to medium-term, or they likely risk
fizzling out. Such a loss of momentum could be deleterious to game workers, many of whom
could interpret the failure of these organizations as closing the book on the appropriateness or
feasibility of unions in their industry.
On Kelly’s last determinant, the legal systems for international unionization do not exist,
and systems which support the Wagnerian enterprise-based model would entail a long road to
unionizing the industry one studio at a time. Here is where the GWU may benefit the most from
building connections with established sectoral unions, such as IATSE or SAG-AFTRA, if those
bodies were to expend political and organizing resources to achieve a sectoral solution. The
inclusion of GWU UK as a semi-autonomous branch within the IWGB is an important example.
In the case of the STJV, the legal organizing model is more permissive to minority unions in the
context of France, or individual voluntary membership in sectoral unions and confederations,
such as those that exist in Sweden. In these environments, it is easier to get an immediate
foothold and legal union status, though representations to employers are arguably weak until a
majority of workers are represented.
Conclusion
The history of individual and collective resistance in the game industry is rich and nuanced.
While our account does not attend in detail to the specificities of each event or action, our
chronology shows how mobilization among games workers occurs over time, how it flags
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grievances, and how it is influenced by numerous factors. With repeated attention, and the
continued poor behavior of employers in regard to salient concerns, workers come to internalize
and own a sense of injustice, which ultimately can lead to labor mobilization. The case of game
developers also shows how forms of collective action continuously emerge to suit the
requirements of the time, the issue, the workers involved, and social and technological
affordances. From individual acts of resistance written into secret code to legal action, media
attention, peer pressure, advocacy groups, and labor unions, game developers, like many others
in the creative and cultural industries, are engaged in active experimentation to find the form of
collective action that will best address their circumstances.
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Endnotes
1

Rockstar’s poor reputation for working conditions was recently reinforced when co-founder

and head writer Dan Houser’s off-hand comment to New York Magazine about “100-hour
weeks” in the making of Red Dead Redemption 2 sparked heavy media scrutiny (Goldberg
2018).
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